Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Pearl H. Steffensen v. Smith's Management
Corporation : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christopher A. Tolboe; Murphy, Tolboe and Mabey; Attorney for Respondent.
Richard B. McKeown; Bradley H. Parker; Parker, McKeown and McConkie; Curtis C. Nesset;
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Steffensen v. Smith\'s Management Corporation, No. 910560.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3766

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

^(0 5Z?O
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEARL H. STEFFENSEN,
Plaintiff/Petitioner/
Cross-Respondent,

Case No. 910560

vs,
SMITH•S
TION,

MANAGEMENT

CORPORAPriority No. 14

De f endant/Respondent/
Cross-Petitioner

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT / CROSS-PETITIONER

Appeal from a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
affirming a judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Scott Daniels

Christopher A. Tolboe, # 3678
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-8505

Richard B. McKeown, #2206
Bradley H. Parker, #2519
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 264-6620
Curtis C. Nesset, #4238
333 North Third West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorneys for Petitioner,
Pearl H. Steffensen

Attorney for Respondent,
Smith's Management Corp.

FILED
AUG

31992

CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PEARL H. STEFFENSEN,
Plaintiff/Petitioner/
Cross-Respondent,

i

Case No. 910560

vs.
SMITH'S
TION,

MANAGEMENT

CORPORAPriority No. 14

De fendant/Respondent/
Cross-Petitioner

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT / CROSS-PETITIONER

Appeal from a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
affirming a judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Scott Daniels

Christopher A. Tolboe, # 3678
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-8505
Attorney for Respondent,
Smith's Management Corp.
Richard B. McKeown, #2206
Bradley H. Parker, #2519
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 264-6620
Curtis C. Nesset, #4238
333 North Third West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorneys for Petitioner,
Pearl H. Steffensen

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities

iii

Jurisdictional Statement

1

Issues Presented for Review

1

Statement of the Case

2

Statement of Facts

2

Summary of Argument

2

Argument

4

Point I
The trial court properly directed verdict to exclude
evidence of actions prior to the point at which Smith's
had a duty to protect Mrs. Steffensen from the acts of
the shoplifter
A.

It is the responsibility of the trial court to determine whether the evidence presented establishes
a prima facie case. A directed verdict is a proper method of dealing with evidence which does not
meet this test

4

6

B.

As a matter of law, Smith's owed no duty to protect Mrs. Steffensen from acts of Mr. Burnett prior to having knowledge that a crime was being committed. Likewise, as a matter of law, evidence as
to lack of deterrence training of store personnel
prior to the time knowledge of a criminal act existed could not establish a prima facie case . . . . 7

C.

The trial court properly directed a partial verdict based upon Mrs. Steffensen1 s failure to establish a prima facie case. The Court of Appeals*
determination that the directed verdict was improper is erroneous

8

Point II
Even if the directed verdict were erroneous, the Court
of Appeals could properly hold that error to be harmless
A.

A harmless error standard is appropriately applied
to directed verdicts and has been used by this
Court in the past

i

10

10

B.

If the direction of a verdict in this matter were
error, the harmless error analysis would lead to
the conclusion that the error was harmless • . • . 11

Point III
The substance of jury instruction No. 32 is consistent
with Utah case law. Even if giving the instruction was
error, it was harmless

12

Point IV
The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial court's
evidentiary rulings excluding the evidence of Mrs. Steffensen's expert
A.

B.

The Court of Appeals erred in finding error in
excluding evidence as to Smith's training program,
but was correct in concluding the error to be
harmless

14

14

The Court of Appeals properly upheld the trial
court's exclusion of testimony from Mrs. Steffensen's expert as to apportionment of negligence . . 16

Point V
Appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice which
would justify reversal of the trial court's evidentiary
decisions on the basis of error

17

Conclusion

18

Certificate of Service

18

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976)

. .

14, 15

Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d
608 (Utah 1982)
6, 9, 10, 11
DeMille v. Erickson. 23 Utah 2d 278, 462 P.2d
(19())

159
6

Dwiqqins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991)
Edwards v. Didericksen. 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979)

7, 8

...

16

Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,
683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984)

6

Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979)

16

Lee v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Serv., 606 P.2d
259 (Utah 1980)

17

Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981) . . . .

10

Matter of Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985)

. . 17

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526
P.2d 47 (Utah 1974)
Rees v. Albertson's. Inc.. 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978J.2, 13,
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247
(Utah 1977)
Rowley v. Graven Bros.. 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209
(1971)

17

State v. Gibson. 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977)

15

State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991)
State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)

17
14
17

1
12

Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482
(Utah App 1991)
7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17
Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605
P.2d 304 (Utah 1979)

iii

14

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(3) (a)

1

RULES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 48
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61

1
11, 17, 18

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402

14

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403

14

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704

16

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Black's Law Dictionary, 5d (1979)

4

Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989)
4

iv

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to hear this case is granted under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992).

The court may hear Smith's cross-

petition pursuant to Rule 48, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Petitioner Pearl H. Steffensen has presented the
following questions for review:
I.

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously apply a harmless

error analysis after it determined that the trial court committed
error

by directing

verdict

in favor

of

Defendant/Respondent

Smith's Management Corporation ("Smith's")?
II.

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously classify foresee-

ability and, in essence, overrule a Utah Supreme Court case holding that Jury Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but that the error
was harmless?
III.

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously affirm the exclu-

sion of evidence in contravention of the Utah Rules of Evidence
and Utah Supreme Court cases?
Defendant/Respondent Smith's presents this additional question for review:
Did the Court of Appeals erroneously determine that the trial
court had erred in partially directing verdict as to activities of
Smith's prior to the time it knew the shoplifter was committing a
crime and apprehended him?
The issues are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness.

State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Smith's agrees with Mrs. Steffensen's statement of the case
except that Smith's motion for partial directed verdict was based
upon the argument that training in the area of deterrence and
failure to use deterrence were, as a matter of lawf not sufficient
proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

(R. 1216 at 2-6)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although somewhat embellished and conclusory, Mrs. Steffensen's statement of facts is accurate and sufficient for this review.

It is important to note that, until Mr. Burnett left the

checkout line, Smith's employees only suspected the possibility of
shoplifting, not the likelihood.

(T. 60-61)

The Smith's employ-

ees apprehended Mr. Burnett without incident and were accompanying
him peacefully to the store's office, nearly arriving before he
fled.

(T. 136-139)

Up until the time Mr. Burnett actually fled,

there was no indication that he would do so.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The central issue in this matter is whether the trial court
properly directed partial verdict.

There are two items to evalu-

The first is whether the plai-

ate prior to directing verdict.

ntiff established, as a matter of law, a prima facie case.

The

second and subsequent evaluation, relied upon by Mrs. Steffensen,
is whether reasonable minds could reach different factual conclusions based upon the evidence.

The trial court made its determi-

nation by evaluating the law.

The Court of Appeals, however,

skipped the prima facie case evaluation and looked only to the
2

second issue.

Had it evaluated the facts against the law to de-

termine whether a prima facie case was established, the Court of
Appeals would have reached the same conclusion as the trial court:
that a directed verdict was proper.
Even if there were an error in granting a partial directed
verdict, that error is harmless.

The Utah Supreme court has used

harmless error analysis in the past in cases dealing with directed
verdicts and that analysis is appropriate in this case.
Jury Instruction No. 32 is, in substance, consistent with
Utah law on foreseeability.

Even if the minor deviation in the

instruction amounts to error, that error is harmless because the
outcome of the case would not be different.

The Court of Appeals

was correct in finding any error to be harmless.
The trial court has discretion in limiting evidence and the
exercise of that discretion may be overturned on appeal only by a
showing of clear abuse of discretion.

The exclusions of evidence

to be offered by Mrs. Steffensen's expert are consistent with the
language and purpose of Utah's rules of evidence. Mrs. Steffensen
has failed to show clear abuse of discretion by the trial court,
both before the Court of Appeals and in the present review.

Ab-

sent this abuse of discretion, the trial court's evidentiary rulings must stand.
The Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the trial
court's evidentiary rulings.
The only serious error in the Court of Appeals decision on
review of this case is its finding that the trial court erred in
directing a partial verdict. Even in light of that, Mrs. Steffen3

sen has failed to make the required showing of substantial prejudice to overcome the proper conclusions that any errors committed
were harmless.
ARGUMENT
Much of the argument in this case involves the concept of
"likelihood" as opposed to "possibility" or "suspicion." For this
reason it is helpful to examine some definitions of the applicable
terms.
likelihood, probability. Clark v. Welch, C C A . Mass.,
140 F.2d 271,273. The word imports something less than
reasonably certain.
probable. Having the appearance of truth; having the
character of probability; appearing to be founded in
reason or experience. Having more evidence for than
against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind
to believe, but leaves some room for doubt; likely.
possible: Capable of existing, happening, being, becoming or coming to pass; feasible, not contrary to nature
of things; neither necessitated nor precluded; free to
happen or not; contrasted with impossible. In another
sense, the word denotes improbability, without excluding
the idea of feasibility.
Black's Law Dictionary. 5d (1979) (emphasis added).

Compare,

Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989).

Note that likelihood is less than certainty but

more than possibility.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED VERDICT TO
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE
POINT AT WHICH SMITH'S HAD A DUTY TO PROTECT
MRS. STEFFENSEN FROM THE ACTS OF THE SHOPLIFTER. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DETERMINATION
THAT THE DIRECTED VERDICT WAS IMPROPER WAS
ERRONEOUS.
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The real issue in this case is whether the trial court properly directed verdict in favor of Smith"s. The trial court could
have simplified this case by directing a verdict on the basis
that, as a matter of law, the evidence did not support a breach of
a subsequently arising duty.
proximate cause.

Instead it entered the realm of

The Court of Appeals erroneously implied that

the directed verdict was improper, based solely on an analysis of
proximate cause, and then determined the error to be harmless.
This holding unnecessarily complicates this case.
At trial and before the Court of Appeals, Mrs. Steffensen
concentrated her evidence and arguments on the issues of training
in and exercise of deterrence.

Inadequate attention was given to

proving that the actions after Mr. Burnett's apprehension caused
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

Only in her brief before this court

does Mrs. Steffensen attempt to raise post-apprehension actions as
causation and only then as they relate to the exclusion of evidence as to Smith's training program.

It is in context of this

emphasis on training in deterrence that the trial court evaluated
Smith's motion for partial directed verdict.
There are two steps required in the proper analysis of whether a directed verdict is appropriate.

First, the court must de-

termine whether the evidence presented is legally sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. After deciding this threshold question, the court then must evaluate, as discussed by petitioner,
whether reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusion arising
from the evidence.

If the evidence does not, as a matter of law,

establish a prima facie case, it is unnecessary for the court to
5

address the second question.
A.

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED ESTABLISHES A PRIMA FACIE
CASE. A DIRECTED VERDICT IS A PROPER METHOD OF DEALING WITH
EVIDENCE WHICH DOES NOT MEET THIS TEST.
It is up to the court to determine whether the evidence pre-

sented by a party establishes a prima facie case.

DeMille v.

Erickson, 462 P.2d 159, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1531, 397 U.S.
1079, 25 L.Ed.2d 814.

A motion for directed verdict is a proper

method of testing the legal sufficiency of the evidence (i.e.,
whether a prima facie case has been established). Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982).
On appeal of a directed verdict, the Supreme Court determines
whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
party against whom the verdict was directed, establishes a prima
facie case.

Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad

Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984).

In Cerritos Trucking, the

Supreme Court evaluated the defendants' evidence in light of established case law and authorities, concluding as a matter of law
that the evidence did not and could not establish a prima facie
case and holding that a directed verdict was proper.

Cerritos

Trucking at 611-12.
The critical determination in the present case is whether
Mrs. Steffensen's evidence could, as a matter of law, have established a prima facie case of negligence against Smith's.
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B.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, SMITH'S OWED NO DUTY TO PROTECT MRS.
STEFFENSEN FROM ACTS OF MR. BURNETT PRIOR TO HAVING KNOWLEDGE
THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED. LIKEWISE, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, EVIDENCE AS TO LACK OF DETERRENCE TRAINING OF STORE
PERSONNEL PRIOR TO THE TIME KNOWLEDGE OF A CRIMINAL ACT EXISTED COULD NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE.
It is well-established law that four elements make up a prima

facie case of negligence: (1) duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) injury to the defendant,
and (4) proximate (legal) cause.

E.g., Steffensen v. Smith's

Management Corp. . 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991).

If, as a

matter of law, Smith's owed no duty to the plaintiff, evidence of
actions prior to the time the duty arose is irrelevant to the
issue of Smith's negligence.
Utah law imposes no duty on Smith's prior to the time it
knows that a criminal act is likely to occur.
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991).

Dwiggins v. Morgan

A business owner is not an

insurer of the safety of its business invitees.

Id.

Comment f to section 344 [Restatement, (Second) Torts] makes it clear that the possessor
"is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any
care until he knows or has reason to know
that the acts of a third person are
occurring, or are about to occur." (Emphasis
added.) Consistent with our earlier cases,
we follow the Restatement and hold that this
duty exists in Utah, but recognize that the
duty does not arise until the business owner
knows, or should know, that criminal acts are
likely to occur.
Dwiggins at 183 (emphasis in original). Note that the standard is
likelihood and not possibility or suspicion. If there is no duty,
the trial court need not address the secondary issues related to
the negligence claims. Id.
The evidence presented at trial did not show that Smith's
7

knew or should have known that Mr. Burnett was going to commit a
crime. True, Smith's employees suspected the possibility of shoplifting.

Steffensen v. Smith's at 485.

Even so, that suspicion

did not amount to knowledge that a criminal act was likely to
occur.

In fact, Mr. Burnett got into line at the checkout stand,

an act which would suggest the unlikelihood of a crime being committed.

Smith's did not know that a criminal act was likely to

occur until Mr. Burnett left the checkout line and walked toward
the exit.
As a matter of law, Smith's owed no duty to protect Mrs.
Steffensen until the point at which Mr. Burnett left the checkout
line and proceeded to the door.

Dwiggins at 183.

It could not

breach that duty until it arose.

As such, it had no duty to use

deterrence measures prior to knowing a crime was likely to occur.
Evidence of actions or inactions by Smith's prior to the time its
duty arose are irrelevant to the issue of proximate cause based
upon breach of that duty. Stated differently, evidence of actions
or inactions taken prior to the establishment of the duty do not
support a prima facie case based upon breach of that duty.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A PARTIAL VERDICT BASED
UPON MRS. STEFFENSEN'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE
CASE. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DETERMINATION THAT THE DIRECTED
VERDICT WAS IMPROPER IS ERRONEOUS.
Smith's requested a partial directed verdict that, as a mat-

ter of law, even if its employees had been inadequately trained in
matters of deterrence and failed to properly deter, those actions
occurred prior to the time the duty arose and were not a breach of
the subsequent duty, so that any lack of training and deterrence
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were not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury.

The

trial court instructed the jury that "all Smith's conduct prior to
the stop and detention of Mr. Burnett should not be considered by
the jury."

Steffensen at 485-86.

In essence, the trial court

determined that, as a matter of law, prior to the time of apprehension there was no duty and therefore the acts or omissions
prior to apprehension could not proximately (legally) cause the
injuries.
The trial court exercised its responsibility to determine, as
a matter of law, that a prima facie case was not established by
the evidence.

Viewing all of the excluded evidence in a light

most favorable to Mrs. Steffensen, it is clear that it dealt with
actions and inactions prior to the time a duty was established by
law.

Consistent with the rationale in Cerritos Trucking. Mrs.

Steffensen could not establish a prima facie case on those facts
and the directed verdict was proper.
The Court of Appeals evaluated only whether reasonable minds
could differ as to whether the excluded evidence supported Mrs.
Steffensen's allegations of Smith's negligence.

It failed to

analyze whether the evidence, as discussed above, established a
prima facie case and failed to determine whether, as a matter of
law, the directed verdict was proper.

Without addressing this

first crucial step, the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded
that the directed verdict was improper.
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POINT II
EVEN IF THE DIRECTED VERDICT WERE ERRONEOUS,
THE COURT OF APPEALS COULD PROPERLY HOLD THAT
ERROR TO BE HARMLESS.
A.

A HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD IS APPROPRIATELY APPLIED TO DIRECTED VERDICTS AND HAS BEEN USED BY THIS COURT IN THE PAST.
Mrs. Steffensen argues that "A directed verdict is only ap-

propriate when the trial court is unable to conclude that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts from the evidence presented."

(Petitioner's Brief, p. 11)

As discussed in Point I,

this is only the second of a two step analysis in determining
whether to direct a verdict.

If this two step analysis had pro-

duced an improper directed verdict, Mrs. Steffensen would still
have to show prejudice such that the error did not amount to harmless error.
Mrs. Steffensen claims that this Court has never, in forty
years, held an erroneous directed verdict to be harmless error.
That does not conclusively support her position that harmless
error analysis does not apply to directed verdicts. In fact, this
Court has on at least two occasions applied harmless error analysis in appeals of directed verdicts.
In Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981) the Supreme Court applied a harmless error analysis to deal with an
alleged error in the trial court's denial of a directed verdict in
favor of plaintiff.

Without deciding whether the refusal to di-

rect a verdict was error, the court determined that if it were
error, it would be harmless. Jd. at 1042.
In Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608
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(Utah 1982) the Supreme Court also applied a harmless error analysis, concluding that the trial court erred in weighing the evidence prior to directing the verdict but holding that the actions
"did not result in prejudicial error since the defendants were not
entitled to succeed in any event."

Id. at 613.

This matter is complicated by the Court of Appeals' analysis
of the directed verdict issue as being one only of credibility of
the evidence. However, as in Cerritos Trucking, Mrs. Steffensen's
evidence failed to legally establish a cause of action such that
she could not succeed, regardless of whether reasonable minds
could differ on the factual interpretation of the evidence.

Be-

yond that, Mrs. Steffensen has failed to show that any error in
directing the verdict was substantial and prejudicial.
B.

IF THE DIRECTION OF A VERDICT IN THIS MATTER WERE ERROR, THE
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS WOULD LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
ERROR WAS HARMLESS.
Mrs. Steffensen cannot be permitted now, on her second ap-

peal, to cure the failure to properly present her case at trial.
In order to prevail on this issue, she must show that any error
was prejudicial in that it substantially affected the outcome of
her case as it was presented to the jury.
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order . . . The
court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added).
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Upon

appeal, the appellant has the burden of proving the prejudicial
nature of the error, i.e. that there is "a reasonable likelihood
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Steffensen v. Smith's at 489, quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120
(Utah 1989).

Note that the standard is "reasonable likelihood"

not possibility.
The Court of Appeals noted that the "the jury"s verdict would
not have differed had the trial judge not granted Smith's partial
directed verdict."

Steffensen v. Smith's at 490.

In fact, the

jury found that Smith's was negligent.
Mrs. Steffensen has failed to present any evidence that, but
for the directed verdict, the outcome would have been different.
The evidence excluded by the directed verdict supported the claims
of negligence.

The jury found negligence.

The true issues of

proximate cause are unrelated to the evidence excluded by the
directed verdict.

Therefore, the outcome would not likely have

been different—possibly perhaps, but not likely.
Because there is no likelihood of a different outcome, any
error in directing verdict is, as concluded by the Court of Appeals, harmless error.
POINT III
THE SUBSTANCE OF JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32 IS
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH CASE LAW. EVEN IF GIVING THE INSTRUCTION WAS ERROR, IT WAS HARMLESS.
The Utah Supreme Court in Rees v. Albertson's. Inc., 587 P.2d
130, 133 (Utah 1978) clarified the definition of foreseeability
stating that it must be reasonably foreseeable "not that the par12

ticular accident would occur, but only that there is n Iikelihood
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occurrence of customer injury when a shoplifter runs (the shoplifter who runs is trying to get away and not run into people),
but it is certainly less than 100% and probably less than 50%. If
injuries occur in fewer than 50% of instances where the shoplifter
runs, that also falls in the realm of possibility. Where there is
a possibility of a possibility, the likelihood standard of foreseeability is clearly not met.
Even if Instruction No. 32 were erroneous, it is unlikely
that the jury would find the injury foreseeable by the Rees standard.

Mrs. Steffensen has failed to present evidence that, but

for the erroneous jury instruction, the outcome would likely have
been in her favor.

Again, the mere possibility of a different

verdict is insufficient. Because the outcome would not be different, any such error must be deemed harmless and therefore nonreversible. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding any error
in Instruction No. 32 to be harmless.
POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY UPHELD THE
TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS EXCLUDING
THE EVIDENCE OF MRS. STEFFENSENVS EXPERT.
A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING ERROR IN EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE AS TO SMITH'S TRAINING PROGRAM, BUT WAS CORRECT IN
CONCLUDING THE ALLEGED ERROR TO BE HARMLESS.
The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether or not

evidence submitted is relevant.
1286, 1290 (Utah 1976).
inadmissible.

Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d

If the evidence is not relevant, it is

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Even if the

evidence is relevant, it may be excluded at the discretion of the
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" [ I ] f they had the worst training program in
the world but the situation were handled adequately, there would be no liability here. .
. And if the situation is handled improperly,
it doesn't matter whether they have the best
training program in the world, the thing is
how it was handled. If they had an inadequate training program, but it was still handled properly, that's not the proximate cause
of anything."
(T. 339-34
1
vant,

I
would serve
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ourpose and was likely to confuse the jury
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issues of the case.
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The Court of Appeals should not, therefore, have substi-

tuted its judgment for that of the trial court and should have
upheld the trial court's evidentiary ruling.
Even so, the Court of Appeals was correct in noting that the
jury found Smith's negligent, making any error harmless. Steffensen v. Smith's at 491.
B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY FROM MRS. STEFFENSEN'S EXPERT AS TO
APPORTIONMENT OF NEGLIGENCE.
Mrs. Steffensen argues that her expert should have been per-

mitted to testify because Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence permits
opinion testimony even if it reaches a legal conclusion.

It is

true that the testimony of an expert is generally admissible even
if it deals with the ultimate issues of the case.
issue argument does not apply heref however.

The ultimate

There is no legal

consensus taking the same position regarding the question of apportionment.

In fact, Utah law holds the issue of apportionment

of fault as a matter for the jury. Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530,
531 (Utah 1979).

Although apportionment may, by strict defini-

tion, be an "ultimate issue," it goes beyond determination of
negligence and is a function restricted to the jury.
Even if expert witness testimony were deemed admissible on
the question of apportionment, Mrs. Steffensen failed to provide
proper foundation for her expert's qualifications to apportion
fault. Lacking proper foundation, the expert's testimony would be
inadmissible.

Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979).

Again, the proper standard for reversing an exclusion of
evidence is clear abuse of discretion.

Mrs. Steffensen made no

such showing before the Court of Appeals nor has she done so here.
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The liial court properly excluded the expert witness testimony and tin< i O H M

i i tppuii i'i » njieruy iiphe i n i hat exclusion.
POINT V

MRS. STEFFENSEN HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE
PREJUDICE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY REVERSAL OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY DECISIONS ON THE
BASIS OF ERROR.
Where

- exclusior,

* evidence does not dffpc i tin-1 subs? anjudgment cannot be disturbed and the

court must disregard the error.
Procedure.
judgment1.

'\<*i Rules

Rul

*L

The appellate
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ii.l,„ ".I I IU.M e

reasonable likelihood tha*

absent
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( Utah

[ appellant

Mattel oi b'stat e of Kesler, 7

3 9H^ | , e i

Lee v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Serv., 606

P.2d 259, 261 (Utah 1980) and Rowley v. Graven Bros,
448, 451, 49] i\\I

I'll'l, 1 ,' I I , l'l,'|

to

As noted above, «

•

sible error must be * substantial and prejudicial" and the appellant has the burden of showing that error. Stef fensen v , SmijLji ' s
at 48?
P

•Lqtrup
•
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g t r a w ^ e r r y water Users Ass'n, 563

' 1 (Utah 1977); Redevelopment Agency" of Salt
1*1/4)

M'h. mrn> la,-!

ceffensen

insufficient

Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d that
to show prejudicial error.

She must clearly demonstrate that the

outcome would have been different

.

•

.

i

^

*v-i~ Drejudiced by

the trial court's evidentiary rulings

••

implications that

the outcome would have beer

*

state17

ments to that effect.

Not only has she failed to show prejudice,

Mrs. Steffensen has failed to demonstrate the substantial prejudice required by Rule 61, U.R.C.P. and by Utah case law.

There-

fore , even if this court finds error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings or the holdings of the Court of Appeals, that error
is not reversible.
CONCLUSION
The only serious error committed by the Court of Appeals was
its failure to properly analyze the basis for granting a directed
verdict leading to the conclusion that directed partial verdict
was improper.

This portion of the decision of the Court of Ap-

peals should be reversed.
Even if errors occurred as outlined by Mrs. Steffensen, she
has failed to meet the burden of establishing substantial prejudice or showing clear abuse of discretion sufficient to overcome
the trial court's rulings or challenge the Court of Appeals decision in this case.

Because any errors are harmless errors, the

overall decision of the Court of Appeals' affirmation should be
affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted the ^ S'

day of July, 1992.

Christopher A. Tolboe
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
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